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MACMILLAN'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION;  
FEBRUARY 21 TO MARCH 3, 1959

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE  
AND RESEARCH



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Excision pp 1 (207)  
pp 2 (208)  
pp 3 (209)  
pp 4 (210)  
pp 5 (211)  
pp 6-11 (212-217)  
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THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Abstract .....	ii
I. Origins of the Trip .....	1
II. Soviet Tactics .....	1
III. Position on Substantive Issues .....	5
IV. The Final Communique .....	10
V. Propaganda Treatment and Public Reaction .....	12
VI. Results of the Trip .....	13

ANNEXES

1. Itinerary of Mr. Macmillan's Visit to the USSR .....	16
2. Soviet-British Communique of March 2, 1959 .....	18
3. Draft of Soviet-UK Nonaggression Pact Submitted on February 28, 1959 .....	21

ABSTRACT

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Prime Minister Macmillan's decision to return the 1956 Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to the UK at this time was motivated by several considerations of internal and external policy. Long-standing domestic British pressures for progress toward a detente with the USSR and the more immediate desire to play a more active role in seeking a way out of the Berlin crisis were undoubtedly key factors. In addition, the British leaders apparently considered it desirable to reconnoiter Soviet positions before a joint Western response to the Berlin challenge is formulated. Finally, the Conservatives probably saw in the trip a means of restoring party prestige after a recent decline due to unemployment. These various considerations were apparently given a compelling impetus by reports that key Labor Party officials were planning a trip to Moscow.

The visit's progress was marked by three broad phases: a first period of relative cordiality, a middle period of coolness punctuated by Khrushchev's tough speech of February 24 and various snubs in the realm of protocol, and the final few days in which animity was more or less restored. Parallelizing this shifting atmosphere, there was an evolution in the Soviet position on the central topic of the Khrushchev-Macmillan talks, that of a possible East-West conference on current German problems. In his speech on February 24, Khrushchev was highly critical of the Western proposal of February 16 for a foreign ministers' conference, while the Soviet note of March 2 (which was shown to Macmillan before delivery to Western embassies) conditionally agreed to such a conference, even though, like Khrushchev, it still expressed a preference for a meeting at the summit. The conditions were a demand for East-West parity and the stipulation that the agenda should be confined to a German peace treaty and the "question of West Berlin." In stating that a foreign ministers' conference could last "two or three months," the note evidently sought to make the Soviet position on Berlin less peremptory since it seemed to offer a way of extending the May 27 deadline for Soviet transfer of access controls on the routes to Berlin.

Any conclusions as to whether these shifts in Soviet behavior were planned or determined by events at the time are necessarily speculative. Undoubtedly Soviet tactics were in some measure responsive to British attitudes; indeed the Soviet leaders have attributed their conduct in the middle

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period to British "toughness." But it seems likely that the Soviet leaders were following deliberately planned tactics designed (1) to strengthen their bargaining position during the talks, (2) to exploit the domestic pressures on the British to achieve a successful outcome and (3) by returning to a more constructive posture at the end, to demonstrate that high-level contacts can be useful. The limited Soviet concession regarding the level of an East-West conference was probably aimed at giving the Soviet position a "reasonable" cast and thereby pressuring the West into making concessions regarding the agenda and the participants.

In the substantive discussions, the principal novel proposition advanced by the Soviets concerned the scheme whereby the Western powers would maintain minimum forces in West Berlin which would be joined by Soviet forces. Access would then be guaranteed by the East Germans in some arrangement with which the four great powers would be associated and which would be registered with the United Nations. Khrushchev offered to extend the May 27 deadline to June or July if the West proved "reasonable," a caveat which Moscow has for some time attached to its offers for extending the deadline. The British were convinced that if East-West negotiations were abortive, the Soviets would proceed with a separate peace treaty with the GDR in an effort to provide a legal basis for a unilateral transfer of access control functions.

On disarmament, the Soviets maintained their strong opposition to Western inspection proposals but showed some interest in a British suggestion for fixing an annual quota of "on-site" inspections under an agreement to discontinue nuclear tests. They also seemed somewhat interested in British arguments that an agreement on ending fissionable materials production would curb fourth country acquisition of nuclear weapons, although this argument has often been presented to them before without effect. The Soviets professed to be strongly in favor of "disengagement" in Europe, though they apparently made no specific proposals; the British, for their part, mentioned their interest in inspected force limitations in Europe.

On bilateral matters, apart from agreeing to promoting trade and cultural exchange, the Soviets advanced -- but the British parried -- a draft non-aggression treaty which resembled similar such treaties proposed in the past but added a clause prohibiting foreign bases, a provision applicable only to the UK since there are no such bases on Soviet territory.

The final communique was a rather generally worded document in which the two sides expressed themselves in favor of settling disputes by negotiation rather than force, of high-level contacts, of agreement on nuclear test cessation, and of considering inspected force limitations in Europe. Both sides also endorsed as an ultimate objective the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

The Soviets were undoubtedly satisfied by the visit, partly because they believe that the final communique, though general in its terms, tended more toward the Soviet position on various issues than toward that of the West and partly because the visit will probably generate new pressures for East-West negotiations. Moscow probably believes that the West will go a long way toward averting a clash over Berlin through negotiations, although it must have recognized that an open challenge to the Western presence in Berlin could not be undertaken without risk of war.

The British reaction has been that their estimate has been confirmed that negotiations on European questions are possible and that the British can take a lead in such negotiations. The British seem convinced that only with Khrushchev would negotiations be meaningful and for this reason favor a summit conference. They regard a foreign ministers' conference as merely a prelude to the higher-level meeting.

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I. ORIGINS OF THE TRIP

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The Macmillan decision to visit Moscow was the outgrowth of a number of external and internal factors which made a "reconnaissance" mission appear to the U. Government as logical and timely. The principal constant factor contributing to the decision has been the public and political pressure in the U. during the past several years for evidence of progress toward a detente with the USSR. More immediately, however, the Berlin crisis confronted British leadership with a potentially explosive issue which, in its view, presented it with the opportunity to play a more active role in narrowing the gap between the "estern and Soviet positions and in dispelling the illusion that the West is unable to display an initiative in the resolution of the crisis. They also believed that the "estern governments were, as Selwyn Lloyd told Secretary Dulles on February 5, in a state of "disarray" as regards Berlin and related problems, and concluded that time permitted a preliminary exchange of views with the Soviets before a joint Western policy was formulated. A measure of the seriousness of the trip was indicated by the fact that the Macmillan entourage included the highest working level officials of the Foreign Office concerned with Germany and European security.

In addition to the views on the merits of the trip itself, the internal political situation in the UK made the decision almost inevitable. As of late January, domestic unemployment caused the Conservative Party popularity to slip slightly behind the Labor Party for the first time since the spring of 1958, and the Conservatives undoubtedly saw the trip as a certain contribution to the recovery of party prestige as well as an enhancement of the Macmillan image. There were reports, furthermore, that key Labor Party officials were planning such a trip themselves, and it behooved government leaders not to permit the opposition to reap the political capital awaiting the "reconnaissance" party reaching Moscow first.

The precise nature of the Soviet-British negotiations leading up to the official announcement of the visit on February 5 is not known at this writing. At least one call on Foreign Secretary Lloyd by the Soviet chargé was reported in the press during January. It seems probable that the British decision to proceed with arrangements was made in mid-January, at the time of Mikoyan's tour of the US.

II. SOVIET TACTICS

There is a general consensus that Soviet behavior during the visit broke down into three general phases: the first, lasting until February 24, the date of Khrushchev's "election" speech, in which the Soviet leaders and the Soviet press evinced a measure of cordiality though no conciliation on substantive issues; the second, running from February 24 to 28, in which the Soviets showed marked coolness punctuated by Khrushchev's tough

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speech in Moscow and Mikoyan's testy remarks in Moscow as well as by the calculated snub of sending only a second-ranking official to accompany the British prime minister to Kiev; and the final period marked by Mikoyan's unexpected appearance in Leningrad with Macmillan on February 28 and an improved atmosphere in the wind-up of the conversations in Moscow.\*

The Soviet position on the terms of a East-West conference on the Berlin and German problems, an issue which was a central topic of the Macmillan-Khrushchev talks, seemed to fluctuate in accordance with these phases. In his February 24 speech, Khrushchev set forth the USSR's first public, authoritative response to the West's notes of February 16 proposing a four-power foreign ministers' conference to deal with "the problem of Germany in all its aspects and implications." Khrushchev on this occasion assumed an extremely tough position, in effect rejecting the Western proposal on all three counts of agenda, participants, and level of negotiations. Regarding the level of negotiations, Khrushchev backed away from (but did not categorically turn down) a foreign ministers' meeting and asserted it would be "more expedient" to hold a meeting of heads of government "of the powers concerned." Khrushchev did not spell out the Soviet position on participation at a conference but strongly indicated that Moscow would demand parity, with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany matching the four Western powers "concerned." On an agenda, Khrushchev rejected the Western formula, reaffirming the Soviet position that the problem of German reunification cannot be discussed in substance by the four former occupying powers and can only be decided by the "two Germanies." He proposed instead that a summit meeting should be held, first and foremost to "reach agreement" on a German peace treaty and the Berlin problem, and also to "examine" questions concerning European security and disarmament.

This position was modified somewhat in the formal Soviet reply of March 2. (The March 2 note was shown to the Macmillan party prior to its publication but was not a subject of discussion between the two sides.)<sup>37</sup> While the note maintained all of the basic Soviet positions on Germany and Berlin and offered no meaningful concessions to the West, in two respects it did represent a softening of the position which Khrushchev set forth on February 24. While expressing strong preference for a summit conference, the note proposed that if the Western powers "are not yet ready to take part in a summit conference," a foreign ministers' conference should be convened to "consider the problem of a peace treaty with Germany and the question of West Berlin," the conference to be attended by the US, the UK, France, the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, plus the "representation" of "both the German states." In addition, the Soviet note evidently sought to make the foreign ministers' conference proposal more attractive to the West by stipulating that it could

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\* See Annex 1 for the itinerary of the Macmillan party in the USSR.

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last as long as "two or three months," i.e., beyond the May 27 deadline for a Berlin settlement.

Any conclusions concerning the shifts in Soviet behaviour noted above -- i.e., whether they were deliberately planned or occasioned by developments at the time -- are necessarily speculative. The British have concluded that the latter interpretation is correct. Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Lloyd told Ambassador Thompson that the two features of the March 2 note cited above -- agreement to a foreign ministers' conference (on Soviet terms) and the weakening of the significance of the May 27 deadline -- were the result of their discussions with Khrushchev. Presumably the British leaders were referring to their insistence on Western rights in Berlin. (Macmillan has since reiterated this opinion in private and public statements.) Lloyd added the opinion that Khrushchev's February 24 speech had been a "real gaffe."

In support of this thesis, there is the fact that both Khrushchev privately and Mikoyan publicly accused Macmillan of having taken a threatening and tough attitude during the middle phase of the talks. Moreover, it is true that the Soviet leaders, as long-time advocates of summit conferences and high-level contacts, had some stake in not permitting the visit to end as a complete fiasco.

However, notwithstanding the probability that the British position during the talks had some impact on the Soviets, it is likely that the British interpretation is incorrect and that Moscow's shift in posture from Khrushchev's rude statements of February 24 to the seemingly more constructive attitude at the conclusion of the talks was a deliberate tactical maneuver designed to gain several advantages. (It is noteworthy that a British estimate prepared before the talks took place predicted a period of calculated toughness on the part of the Soviets during the visit.)

First, the Soviet leaders probably hoped that this tactic would enhance their bargaining position during their talks with the British leaders and would make the British more amenable to Soviet views. They probably believed that the British were under strong domestic pressure to conclude a successful conference and were willing to compromise in order to achieve this result. Even if Khrushchev's tough line failed to produce any immediate weakening of the British position -- and this was apparently the case -- then Moscow still had much to gain and little to lose by returning to an accommodating mood and closing the conference in a spirit of relative harmony. At a minimum, this would tend to support Moscow's long-standing contention that high-level talks between East and West serve a useful purpose.

Second, the Soviets probably calculated that this tactic would enhance their bargaining position on the continuing problem of the terms of an East-West conference on Berlin and Germany. By first calling unequivocally for a summit conference -- as Khrushchev did on February 24 --

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and then offering, as a supposedly less desirable alternative from the Soviet point of view, a foreign ministers' conference, Moscow apparently expected to demonstrate its "reasonableness" in meeting the West half way (i.e., on the level of negotiations) in hopes thereby of pressuring the West to make a concession of its own regarding agenda and participants. And if no agreement could be reached on the terms of a foreign ministers' conference or if such a conference failed to make any progress, the West, in Moscow's probable assessment, would come to the conclusion that the last hope of averting the transfer to the East Germans of control over Allied access to Berlin (and the attendant grave choice between acquiescence and military action) would be to go to the summit.

[It would appear that this tactic has already borne fruit. As noted above, Macmillan has interpreted the Soviet agreement to a foreign ministers' conference as a concession achieved through his talks with the Soviet leaders. Moscow seems content to have him interpret events in this way. In reality, however, the March 2 note represents a distinct hardening of the previous Soviet position concerning talks on German questions. The Soviet notes of September 18, 1950 and January 10, 1959 stated that preliminary negotiations on a German peace treaty could be limited to the four former occupying powers plus East and West Germany. Mikoyan's aide memoire of January 5 took a similar position on talks on Berlin. The March 2 note, on the other hand calls for full parity (without actually using the term) at a foreign ministers' conference limited to these very subjects. The note also maintains that summit talks on a peace treaty which were limited to the four powers "could" only cause difficulties in achieving agreed solutions." Moreover, as noted above, Moscow has left the gate wide open for a summit conference should a foreign ministers' conference fail to materialize or reach agreement.

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## III. POSITION ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

[Based largely on British sources, the following is a summary of the substantive positions taken by the Soviet leaders during their sessions with the British.

Berlin and German Questions. Khrushchev strongly reaffirmed Soviet demands that the status quo in Europe (i.e., Europe's division and the existence of communist regimes in Eastern Europe) be recognized by the West. The British concluded from this that the Soviet Government, in its current diplomatic offensive on Berlin and Germany, is mainly preoccupied by the desire to strengthen its hold on Eastern Europe.

As a corollary to the above point, Khrushchev maintained that the West Germans must reconcile themselves to the abandonment of any hope of absorbing Eastern Germany. Unification, according to him, could come about only if the two different systems in the two parts of Germany were taken account of and if there was parity between the two sides, i.e., a "confederation" of two equal, sovereign states in which the communist regime in the GDR would be preserved. The British also reported reaffirmation of the Soviet line that unification is a matter which can only be settled by the Germans themselves. Khrushchev's Moscow speech of February 24 and the Soviet note of March 2 strongly insisted on ruling out four-power consideration of the subject. Khrushchev reiterated proposals for confederation including an all-German government on the basis of parity. As in his Party Congress speech, he said he did not object to free elections at some point as long as they were arranged by the Germans themselves.

The British found little evidence of Soviet hurry about detaching the Federal Republic from NATO and preventing the growth of Western Germany as a nuclear power.

The British thought the Soviets were determined to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany, though not before negotiations with the West had occurred or while a conference was in progress. (Since the visit, Khrushchev has announced in increasingly explicit terms the USSR's intention of signing a separate peace treaty, as a legal basis for transferring Berlin access controls to the East Germans, if the West fails to join in signing a peace treaty with both parts of Germany.) Khrushchev asserted that if after a separate treaty was concluded, the West violated the GDR's territory the USSR would have to come to its assistance and if war resulted it would be the West's fault. One novel point was a Soviet statement that "for a period" the two Germanies could stay in their respective alliances if a joint peace treaty is signed.

The British noted a shift in the Soviet position regarding Berlin. Whereas on November 27, Moscow had declared as already invalid the agreements on which Western rights were based, Khrushchev took the line that

these rights would only be extinguished from the date a peace treaty is signed, either with both German states or with East Germany alone. Khrushchev's statements to the British correspond to the public Soviet line, and it does appear that a shift has occurred. A 3 4 5

Khrushchev more than once said that the USSR would be willing to consider amendments to its original proposal for a "free city" of West Berlin. This has been the Soviet position since the proposal was first advanced on November 27, although Moscow has customarily qualified it with the stipulation that any amendments must be directed at ending the "occupation regime" in West Berlin. For his own part, Khrushchev elaborated on hitherto vague Soviet suggestions that the free city status of West Berlin could be guaranteed by the four powers and the two German states, that international observers could be stationed in West Berlin and that the whole arrangement could include some form of UN participation.

Khrushchev suggested that "police forces" of the three Western powers and the USSR (the latter's forces being one fourth of the total), or neutral forces could be stationed in West Berlin to observe that a guarantee is kept. Forces would be of "token strength." Access would be provided for by agreement among the "powers concerned" and registered with the UN. There could be an East German declaration to guarantee access with which the four powers would associate themselves. There would be provision for sanctions. The arrangement could apply only to West Berlin, since East Berlin is the capital of the GDR. Indeed, West Berlin would have to sever its relations with the Federal Republic and cease sending representatives to the Bundestag. Khrushchev maintained that in any event West Berlin is legally part of the GDR's territory.

Most of the provisions of this scheme were disclosed publicly by Khrushchev in a speech in East Berlin on March 9. They may have been in Mikoyan's mind when he told Secretary Dulles on January 5 that "no one was asking for withdrawal from West Berlin" and that the Soviets were asking "the termination of the occupation, not the withdrawal of forces." A 3

[According to the British] these propositions were not put forward as a definitive proposal but rather as suggestions by the Soviets. The British have concluded that Moscow is prepared to see Western forces continue to be present in West Berlin. In any event, Khrushchev's propositions are consistent with the minimum goals respecting Berlin pursued by the USSR since the outset of the crisis: (1) to get the West to accept full East German control over access to Berlin and to enhance the international prestige of the GDR by entering into direct dealings with it; and (2) to end the role of West Berlin as a haven for refugees and as a threat to East German stability. A 3, 4 5

Khrushchev repeated Soviet assertions that the May 27 deadline for a Berlin "settlement" was not an ultimatum and could be postponed. In

or even July. Khrushchev has since made a similar statement in East Germany, attaching, however, the caveat that postponement of the deadline could take place if the West was "reasonable." This general line is of course, not new. Since late December, Soviet spokesmen have been denying that there is a Soviet ultimatum, evidently in response to statements by the West that it would not negotiate under threat. Mikoyan, in a Moscow press conference on January 21, went further, stating that the deadline could be extended two or three weeks or even two or three months "if we are convinced of good will on the part of the Western powers to negotiate with the object of ending the occupation regime in Western Berlin." More recently Khrushchev remarked to a foreign ambassador that the May 27 date was merely included in the November 27 note on Berlin in order to have some target date. Finally, the Soviet note of March 2, in proposing a two to three month duration for a foreign ministers' conference, also served to soften the ultimative character of the Soviet proposals on Berlin. Against all these efforts to gloss over the original deadline date must be set the fact that there is evidence that preparations for moving Soviet forces out of East Berlin seem to be operating with a May 25 deadline in view.

European Security. [The British apparently spoke a good deal about their interest in various schemes for limitation of forces in Europe.] The Soviets professed to be strongly in favor of "disengagement" (a phrase which is now part of the Soviet vocabulary), arguing that the further apart were the troops of the two contending sides, the greater the safeguard to peace. "Disengagement" currently figures in the agenda proposed by the USSR for a summit conference. It should be noted, however, that to date the USSR has not formally committed itself to withdrawing its troops from Eastern Europe in exchange for only the withdrawal of foreign troops from the European continent. In its formal proposals, Moscow always has additionally called for (either explicitly or implicitly) the "liquidation of all foreign bases."

Disarmament. With respect to disarmament, the Soviets expressed some interest in a British suggestion that under an agreement to discontinue nuclear tests, on-site inspections might be limited to a fixed number per year. Moscow has been objecting to automatic dispatch of on-site inspection teams when ambiguous events, which might or might not be nuclear explosions, occur. It seems doubtful that even if Moscow should be interested in some annual quota of inspections, it would permit them to occur without prior approval in each instance.

Khrushchev also seemed to suggest some flexibility on the question of the staffing of inspection posts, indicating a possibility of increasing the number of non-host-country personnel. But he gave no indication of changing the Soviet position that posts should be basically manned by host-country personnel and that post directors should be host-country nationals. Khrushchev was firm in insisting on a Soviet veto in the control machinery and also said that USSR would not be interested in

an agreement confined only to banning tests in the atmosphere.

The British raised the Western proposal for a cut-off in fissionable materials production for weapons purposes. Khrushchev countered this with the standard Soviet proposition that it would have to be combined with a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. He did not apparently refer to the additional measure of destroying nuclear weapons stockpiles, which Moscow customarily proposes in response to this Western proposal; however, the omission is probably not significant since Soviet statements have on several occasions been imprecise on these issues.

The British mentioned the utility of a cut-off in preventing fourth country production and reported that Khrushchev to have showed some interest in this angle. But this argument has been made to the Soviets many times before without apparent effect. At the same time, there have been periodic Soviet public and private hints that Moscow may deem its current fissionable materials reserves sufficient to permit a unilateral suspension of further production. Such a move remains a possibility.

Khrushchev expressed skepticism regarding the new United Nations 82-member disarmament commission (even though the body was first proposed by the USSR) and indicated he could agree to a subcommittee provided there was parity. This is a position which the USSR has taken since the fall of 1957.

In general, Khrushchev gave vent to overriding suspicion of extensive inspection within the USSR, viewing it as designed for espionage and intelligence gathering, especially on Soviet missile sites. He expressed this attitude in connection with both the Western inspection proposals for a test ban and the Western approach to the surprise attack problem. In regard to the latter, he argued against priority for a technical approach and gave no indication of interest in a resumption of the East-West talks on the subject.

[On balance, therefore, Macmillan elicited little new from the Soviets in the disarmament field.] A5

East-West Conference. On the question of East-West negotiations, the British thought that Khrushchev was not seeking a summit conference at all costs, though they report finding him receptive to their idea that summit meetings could be interspersed with meetings at lower levels. The Soviet attitude on this matter, as reflected in the note of March 2 and recent private statements, appears to be that if the West can be induced to consider the Soviet proposals on Berlin and a German peace treaty the level of a conference is of less importance. On the other hand, Moscow's insistence on parity seems to be firmer in the case of a foreign ministers' conference than in that of a summit.

Bilateral Issues. The main Soviet initiative in the field of UK-USSR relations was the proposal for a bilateral non-aggression pact. The record is not clear on whether the Soviet proposal was broached before Khrushchev's Moscow speech on February 24 in which he devoted considerable space to it. One British participant in the talks has indicated that it had not previously been brought up. If correct, this would make Khrushchev's public reference to it a calculated act of rudeness. In any event, Khrushchev's purpose was presumably to put pressure on the British to show themselves receptive to such a proposal, especially given the fact that Macmillan himself has on occasion shown some interest in some form of East-West non-aggression commitment. A3 A7

The Soviet draft treaty resembled similar proposals made to the US in 1956 and Italy in 1958.\* Moscow since 1956 has also been advocating multilateral non-aggression treaties between NATO and the Warsaw Pact or between individual NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. A novel feature in the Soviet draft was a provision for an undertaking not to permit the location of foreign bases on the territories of the signatories, a provision which would apply only to the UK since no such bases are present in the USSR. Inclusion of this provision is a reflection of Moscow's more demanding attitude toward the West.

The British apparently held firm in opposing the Soviet draft, proposing instead a three-point declaration: (1) in all matters of dispute the two parties would act in the spirit and letter of the UN charter, (2) neither side would seek unilaterally to prejudice the rights, obligations and vital interests of the other, and (3) the two governments would agree that disputes should be settled by negotiations and not by force. This discussion apparently remained inconclusive. Moscow, however, can be expected to press for such pacts in the future, particularly since it seems to believe that some remarks by Macmillan in January 1958 favoring some form of multilateral non-aggression agreement make him susceptible to such overtures.

On trade, the British agreed to send to Moscow a mission headed by a minister to "investigate the scope" of further exchanges. There was also agreement to work out further cultural exchanges, including the exchange of motion pictures and television materials. Representatives of the Soviet relations committee of the British Council are scheduled to go to the USSR later in March.

\* See Annex 3 for the text of the Soviet draft non-aggression pact with the UK.

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IV. THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE\*

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Negotiations on the joint communique apparently lasted only about an hour. The document, rather brief as such documents go, noted that there had been no negotiations but that there has been a valuable exchange of views which created a better understanding of the respective attitudes and "made a useful contribution toward the forthcoming negotiations on a wider circle."

The communique stated that a common objective was the "ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons", although both sides have on past occasions acknowledged the technical infeasibility of such a prohibition. It was agreed that efforts would be continued to seek a "satisfactory agreement" on discontinuance of nuclear tests with an effective international system of inspection and control in view of the considerations that such an agreement would reduce tensions, eliminate possible dangers to health and life and help avert further development of nuclear weapons. Moscow customarily cites these three purposes in calling for a test ban.

The communique further noted the inability of the two sides to agree about the "juridical and political aspects" bearing on the questions relating to Germany "including a peace treaty...and the question of Berlin." Reunification was not mentioned. There was agreement "on the need for early negotiations between the interested governments to establish a basis for the settlement of these differences." With respect to European security it was agreed that "further study could usefully be made of the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection." There was no mention of a relationship between such regional limitations and German unification, although Macmillan has since said that such a relationship was in his mind.

It was further stated that "in relation to all these matters the prime ministers' endorsed the principle that differences between nations should be resolved by negotiation and not by force." [The British apparently regard this clause as a significant Soviet commitment, although] it must be noted that it is completely consistent with standard Soviet affirmations. Moreover, the statement cuts both ways since Moscow could well charge that it would be violated by any Western effort to keep open the corridors to Berlin. A 5

There were brief references to increased trade and cultural relations (on the latter there was an annex), and the document concluded with an expression of confidence that the personal contacts which had been established would be continued in the interests of the development of friendship and cooperation between the two sides and in the interests of peace generally.

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\* See Annex 2 for the text of the joint communique.

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The British attempted to spell out their position on a non-aggression pact which the Soviets countered by inserting a statement on the five principles of coexistence. The subject was dropped.

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V. PROPAGANDA TREATMENT AND PUBLIC REACTION

Soviet Propaganda Treatment of Visit. The volume of coverage accorded the visit by Soviet media was moderate, with material during the visit largely confined to brief news items on the visitors' activities and summaries or texts of speeches. Anti-British material apparently was omitted from the press. Pravda, Izvestiya, and the English language Moscow News carried editorials the day Macmillan arrived stressing that the British people and the whole world wanted to end the cold war and that the first duty of statesmen was to realize this "just desire of the peoples." The Anglo-Soviet World War II alliance and the Soviet leadership's visit to the UK in 1956 were favorably recalled. (Bulganin's name was not mentioned.) The papers expressed the hope that the renewal of personal contacts would facilitate better understanding and closer points of view by both governments on the most important international questions, including Berlin and Germany.

These articles and radio broadcasts at the outset of the visit may be described as generally cautious if not somewhat skeptical. Editorials in the main Moscow papers at the end of the visit took a somewhat more favorable line, stressing the "usefulness" of the exchanges of views between the leaders and the value of personal contacts. Pravda agreed with the British view that approval of the principle that differences should be settled by negotiation rather than force was a positive feature of the talks. It noted, however, that agreement was not achieved on all issues, stating at the same time that it would have been unrealistic to expect this. It also made the usual point that ideological differences should be no bar to cooperation.

Lest the Soviet people might be led to expect too much from the visit, the press carried some cautionary notes on alleged US and West German opposition to the visit. As noted earlier, Mikoyan in his Rostov speech during the "cool" phrase of the visit claimed that Macmillan's "toughness" had been the result of US pressure. And a public lecturer in Moscow on February 22 asserted that Bonn regards England as the "weak link" in the Big Four alliance.

Macmillan's brief speeches were reprinted in full in the Soviet press with two exceptions. His Kremlin speech on February 21 which had several references to the British standard of living (individual homes with gardens, an automobile in every third household), the danger of war by "muddle," and the nature of the British Commonwealth, was published in edited form, omitting or abbreviating these passages. His television speech on the final day which contained more detailed descriptions of British life and accomplishments was reported briefly with selected and misleading quotations though some five million viewers reportedly heard him. However, the Soviet press normally does not print television speeches by visiting foreigners.

It is of course difficult to assess the impact on the Soviet public of Macmillan's statements regarding British life. It is a fact, however, that until they heard the Prime Minister, Mr. Auden had seen little if anything in the Soviet press to indicate the extent of British housing construction and other types of production for the consumer and were probably not aware that per capita production in the UK is still twice that in the USSR.

Public Reaction in the UK. There is not the slightest doubt that the trip suited the mood of the British public and has enhanced the prestige of Macmillan and his party. The latest Gallup Poll (News Chronicle, March 5) indicates that 85 percent of the British voters are in favor of summit talks (as compared with 71 percent in February). As for the trip itself, 82 percent of those polled think Macmillan was right to go to Moscow, with a strong majority of those convinced that the visit fulfilled expectations -- i.e., the easing of international tensions. An interesting by-product of the visit was the increasing belief (from 37 to 53 percent) that the US also wants to end the cold war. Even Macmillan's principal opponents, the leaders of the Labor Party, have refrained from criticizing the trip and have been obliged to recognize that, on this issue at least, he has stolen their thunder.

#### VI. RESULTS OF THE TRIP

The Soviet View. Moscow was undoubtedly satisfied with the results of the visit. First of all, the Soviet probably consider the final communique as a useful document from their point of view. Although the agreements expressed in the communique, with the exception of the appended "Cultural Agreement," cannot be regarded as binding on either party (the communique expressly dealt with an "exchange of views" and not negotiations between the two governments), they did reflect the Soviet point of view on several major issues and in no instance contradicted or weakened the existing Soviet position. (1) The Soviets probably believe that the UK was placed on record as favoring "early negotiations between the interested governments" on "questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin." Moscow thus probably feels it gained a point here by the omission of any specific reference to discussing a peace treaty and the Berlin problem in the context of reunification talks. (2) The UK expressed itself as favoring the study of appropriately inspected regional arms limitation without explicitly tying such limitations to German reunification. This again is a point long urged by the USSR. (3) In the Soviet view the UK accepted as a common objective "ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons (a long-standing Soviet propaganda demand).

Secondly, the visit almost certainly has generated new pressure for high level contacts both because in the end it turned out to be a rather amicable affair and because the British Prime Minister has returned con-

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vinced that a summit conference is the only way of approaching international problems at this time. In addition, of course, the British all but committed the British to further such contacts.

Thirdly, Moscow could not but note with satisfaction that notwithstanding the snubs administered to Macmillan in Khrushchev's speech of February 24 and in the failure of Khrushchev and other high-ranking officials to accompany him to Kiev as scheduled, the British were prepared to seek an amicable outcome of the talks and to accept a communique which, though rather general, leaned more to the Soviet position than to that of the West.

It would appear likely that the Soviet leaders will deduce from British behavior in Moscow and from Macmillan's attitude since his return that the West as a whole will go a long way toward averting, by means of negotiation, an open clash over Berlin. Their own resolve to press forward with the Berlin issue thus has probably been strengthened. This is not to say that they have led to conclude that an open and unambiguous challenge to the Western position in Berlin can be undertaken without risk of war. But at the very least Moscow must see enhanced opportunities for maneuver and for obtaining the minimum objective of Western acquiescence in GDR control over access to Berlin.

It is of some interest that the British had the impression that the Soviets for the present are preoccupied with the desire to strengthen their hold in Eastern Europe even though they also felt that the detachment of West Germany from NATO and the prevention of West Germany's growth as a nuclear power remain among the principal aims of the Soviet Government. It is testimony to Moscow's feeling of increased strength that, if this British assessment of current Soviet pre-occupation is correct, Moscow should seek to meet its problems by attacking a position in the maintenance of which the West has historically been strongly committed.

It may be that a Western posture of willingness to compromise and negotiate will exert some pressure on the USSR to be more conciliatory as well. But Moscow almost certainly considers its military position with respect to Berlin as strong and its freedom of unilateral action -- in turning over access controls and signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR -- as great. In this situation, the Soviet leaders probably believe the pressure on the West for conciliation to be far greater than upon themselves.

**The British View.** Macmillan's principal reaction to his trip has been that it confirmed his estimate that the future of central Europe is negotiable and that Britain must take a lead in the conduct of such negotiations. He is persuaded that meaningful discussions with the Soviets can occur only at the summit since only Khrushchev among the Soviet leaders is capable of engaging in give-and-take negotiations. As noted above, the British seem to believe that Soviet acceptance, in the March 2 note, of a meeting at the foreign ministers level, was obtained by their own skill and

- 15 -

attitude during the Moscow talks after Khrushchev had on February 24 said a foreign ministers' conference was ~~useless~~ (without, however, completely ruling it out). But they regard such a meeting as merely a prelude to a summit conference and would probably like to see the West committed to the latter even before the foreign ministers met. Their apparent hope is that, by having a summit conference scheduled in the not-too-distant future, time can be gained in the Berlin crisis, permitting public pressures to operate on the Soviets in order to prevent, at least for the moment, any unilateral Soviet action on access controls. Similar motivations might lead the British to revive their proposal of last January 13 for a permanent commission to deal with the German question. In any event they can be expected, particularly in view of Secretary Dulles' illness, to display increased initiative toward finding possible diplomatic solutions.

On the specifics of negotiations with the Soviets, the British are agreeable to a foreign ministers' conference on May 11 with a broad agenda somewhat as follows: "the problems connected with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin." If the USSR agreed to the formula (and Moscow would be aware that the formula would be designed to permit discussion of unification), the Soviet negotiators would probably maintain that they made no provision for the discussion of reunification, that the problem of reunification cannot be discussed by the four former occupation powers and can only be resolved by the "two Germanies" on the basis of the communist "confederation" plan.

If absolutely necessary to achieve the opening of negotiations the British seem prepared to have Poland and Czechoslovakia participate in the conference as proposed by Moscow. British preference for a summit conference appears to be for July or August; the agenda in this case would be "much broader," presumably including the various disarmament topics suggested in the Soviet note of March 2. A 3 A 5

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- 16 -

Itinerary of Mr. Macmillan's Visit to the USSR

February

- 21 -- Arrives Moscow. Met at airport by Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and others. Brief welcoming speeches.
- Meeting in Kremlin between Macmillan and Khrushchev, with Foreign Secretary Lloyd, Ambassador Reilly, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Ambassador Malik present.
- Dinner given by Khrushchev in Kremlin. Toasts by Khrushchev and Macmillan.
- 22 -- Day spent at dacha, with two long "unofficial" talks between Khrushchev and Macmillan.
- 23 -- Meeting in Kremlin between Macmillan and Lloyd and Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev and Mikoyan.
- Dinner given by British Ambassador. Speeches by Macmillan and Khrushchev.
- 24 -- Khrushchev delivers "election" speech in Kremlin rejecting Western proposals on East-West talks on Germany.
- Macmillan visits nuclear research institute at Dubna, near Moscow.
- Meeting between Macmillan and Khrushchev at dacha. Mikoyan, foreign ministers and ambassadors present.
- 25 -- Luncheon given for Khrushchev by Macmillan at dacha, followed by another meeting with same principal participants.
- Attends ballet at Bolshoi theater.
- 26 -- Another meeting in Kremlin with same participants.
- Macmillan and party leave for Kiev. Khrushchev detained by "toothache." Macmillan met at airport by N. T. Kalchenko, Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.
- 27 -- Dinner given by Kalchenko for Macmillan. Speeches by both.
- Visit to collective farm.

UNCLASSIFIED

881137 - 222

February

- 27 -- Visit to economic exhibit.  
 -- Tour of places of interest in Kiev.
- 28 -- Departs Kiev, arrives Leningrad.  
 -- Visits shipbuilding works, sees atomic icebreaker.  
 -- Attends opera with Mikoyan and others.

March

- 1 -- Luncheon given by Mikoyan.  
 -- Dinner given for Macmillan by Chairman Smirnov of Leningrad City Soviet. Speeches by both, by Lloyd, and by Mikoyan.  
 -- Leaves Leningrad for Moscow.
- 2 -- Meeting in Kremlin between Macmillan and Khrushchev, with usual other participants.  
 -- Reception given in Kremlin by Soviet Government. Speeches by Khrushchev and Macmillan.  
 -- Macmillan speaks on Moscow television.
- 3 -- Joint communique issued; agreement on cultural exchanges annexed thereto. Singing ceremony in Kremlin.  
 -- Press conference by Macmillan.  
 -- Leaves Moscow for London. Seen off by Khrushchev. Farewell speeches at airport.

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- 18 -

Annex 2

Soviet-British Communiqué of March 2, 1959

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At the invitation of the Government of the USSR, Mr. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, accompanied by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and official advisers paid a return official visit to the Soviet Union from February 21 to March 3, 1959.

In the course of their visit, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Lloyd had the opportunity to hold a series of discussions with Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and other members of the Soviet Government, including Mr. A. I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council Ministers, and Mr. A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

These discussions ranged over some of the more important questions which are currently of general international concern. Both sides, however, took account of the fact that these questions concern many countries other than the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Although they did not hold negotiations, the Prime Ministers have been able in the course of their discussions during the past 10 days to hold a valuable exchange of views on these questions. They have taken advantage of this to explain their attitude, and the reasons underlying it, on all questions discussed.

The free interchange of views and ideas which has taken place has created a better understanding of the respective attitudes of the two Governments, and has thereby made a useful contribution toward the forthcoming international discussions in a wider circle.

The Prime ministers agreed that an advance toward a solution of the problem of disarmament would be a major contribution to the maintenance of peace. It would help to increase international confidence and to reduce the burden of military expenditure. They agreed to continue their efforts to make progress in this field.

Their common objective remains--the ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons and the application of nuclear energy solely to peaceful purposes.

They recognized, however, the great importance of achieving agreement to stop nuclear weapons tests under an effective system of international inspection and control. They reviewed the course of the work of the Geneva Conference on discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and resolved to continue their efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement. They considered that such an agreement would reduce tension, would eliminate the possible danger to health and life resulting from nuclear weapons tests, and would help to avert the further development of nuclear weapons.

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The Prime Ministers exchanged full explanations of the views held by their respective governments on questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin... They were unable to agree about the juridical and political aspects of the problems involved.

At the same time they recognized that it was of great importance for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world that these problems should be urgently settled. They therefore acknowledged the need for early negotiations between the interested governments to establish a basis for the settlement of those differences. They considered that such negotiations could lay the foundations for a stable system of European security. In this connection they agreed that further study could usefully be made of the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection.

In relation to all these matters the Prime Ministers endorsed the principle that differences between nations should be resolved by negotiations and not by force. They recognized that if such negotiations were to succeed, it is important that each side should make a sincere endeavor to understand the point of view of the other. They agreed that the present visit of the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Union had made a valuable contribution toward such an understanding.

The Prime Ministers also discussed a number of particular questions which are of direct concern to the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. They took note with approval of a report by representatives of the two governments on the developments of exchange in the cultural field. This report is attached as an annex to this communique.

They also reviewed the state of Anglo-Soviet trade. They noted with satisfaction that the long-term trend of trade between the two countries was upward and that there was scope for increasing this trade. They agreed that a mission led by a United Kingdom Minister should visit the Soviet Union in the near future to investigate the scope for further trade in more detail than was possible during the present talks.

The Prime Ministers expressed their confidence that the personal contacts which had been established between the heads of Governments of the Soviet Union and of the United Kingdom would be continued in the interests of the development of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the two countries, as well as in the interests of preservation and consolidation of universal peace.

Signed: Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.  
N. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

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- 20 -

Moscow, March 3, 1959

Annex - Agreement on Cultural Exchanges

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The representatives of the two countries reviewed the progress achieved in fulfilling on an increasing scale programs of exchanges in the cultural field envisaged in the 1956 joint declaration on this subject.

They agreed to continue their joint efforts for the development of relations along the lines established in that declaration and also by the promotion of future exchanges in the fields of industry and agriculture.

They agreed that interchange of people and knowledge on this basis is leading toward greater mutual understanding, friendship, and peace between the British and Soviet peoples.

They noted with satisfaction that representatives of the Soviet relations Committee of the British Council will come to Moscow in the second half of March to reach agreement with the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the participation of the appropriate bodies concerned, on a program for the coming year of cultural, educational, scientific and technical exchanges between the USSR and the United Kingdom and they expressed the hope that the two committees would seek to establish a basis of such programs for a longer period ahead.

In this connection the representative of the two Governments agreed to invite the television and film interests in their respective countries to consider in a constructive spirit on a basis of mutual advantage the purchase from each other, on a commercial basis and on an increasing scale, of films and television material.

It was also agreed that representatives of each Government should meet at intervals of not more than a year alternately in London and Moscow to review progress and discuss further developments in the whole field of cultural relations between the two countries.

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- 21 -

Annex 3

Draft of Soviet-UK Nonaggression Pact Submitted on February 28, 1959

During Mr. Macmillan's stay in the USSR the Soviet Government proposed the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty between the two countries. On Saturday Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, tendered a draft of the treaty to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary.

Treaty of Nonaggression Between the USSR and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the one hand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the other, desiring to confirm their wish to live in peace with each other and with all states and their resolve to be guided in international relations by the purposes and principles of the U. N. Charter, desiring to make their contribution to improving the international situation, particularly the situation in Europe, by measures designed to preserve the peace and create an atmosphere of trust in the relations between states, have decided to conclude the present non-aggression treaty and appointed as their plenipotentiary representatives of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR blank follows for name of plenipotentiary/ and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland blank follows for name of plenipotentiary/ who on presentation of their credentials found in the proper form and due order agreed on the following:

Article One: The high contracting parties, having regard for the fact that the use of force or the threat of force in international relations is forbidden by the U.N. Charter, solemnly declare that they shall refrain from attack and shall not resort to the use of armed force or a threat of force against each other.

Article Two: In the belief that the establishment of military bases on foreign territories breeds suspicion in the relations between states, tends to aggravate the international situation, and heightens the danger of a new war, the high contracting parties undertake not to permit the stationing of foreign military bases on their territories and accordingly shall take steps to abolish at the earliest possible date existing foreign military bases wherever they may be.

Article Three: All controversial issues that may arise between the high contracting parties shall be resolved in a spirit of mutual understanding by negotiation, by the abrogation of other means for the settlement of international disputes, as envisaged in the U.N. Charter.

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UNCLASSIFIED

- 22 -

Article Four: Should some state resort to force or the threat of force against one of the high contracting parties, the other high contracting parties shall not give the state which resorted to force or the threat of force any direct support and shall take every possible measure on behalf of a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Article Five: The present treaty shall remain in force for a period of 20 years from the day it becomes effective. It is subject to ratification and shall become effective immediately on exchange of the implements of ratification, which is to take place in the shortest possible time.

Article Six: The present treaty may be adhered to by any European state as well as the United States of America.

In token whereof the plenipotentiary representatives have signed the present treaty and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in the city of blank 1959 in two copies, each in Russian and English, both texts being equally authentic.

Signed on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by blank.

Signed on behalf of Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by blank.

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